The micro-data on prices indicate that prices, on average, remain unchanged for several months. However, central banks (e.g. European Central Bank) use models for monetary policy analysis that ignore this fact on the grounds that they can explain the persistence of inflation well. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of implementing policies that are optimal from the perspective of a model that ignores the micro-data. The findings reported in the paper suggest that policy conclusions are significantly affected by whether persistence arises in a manner consistent with the micro-data and that employing models that do not respect micro-data can lead to costly policy mistakes.
Introduction
1 CMR assumes full indexation. The NAWM model estimates that the degree of indexation in the Euro Area is lower than that in the CMR model and is around 40%. Note also that, in the CMR model, a di¤erent approach to indexation is adopted. It is assumed that prices are indexed to an "indexation" index, which is a weighted average of past in ‡ation and the central bank's time varying in ‡ation objective. Speci…cally, in this model, the central bank changes its target every period and …r m s adjust their prices every period according to the central bank's objective. Their …n d i n g s indicate that the weight on past in ‡ation in such an index is around 10%. Given that number, they conclude that the degree of indexation in their model is low. This conclusion, however, is incorrect, as it ignores the e¤ect of the time varying in ‡ation objective assumption on prices. Regardless of the degree of indexation to past in ‡ation, the prices remain fully indexed in the CMR model since the authors replace like with like.
It could be the case that this feature of the micro-data is ignored and the IC model is used for monetary analysis because of the assumption that this aspect of the model that is inconsistent with the micro-data does not a¤ect the policy conclusions that arise from the model. If this is true, then this calls for an examination of whether policy conclusions are a¤ected by whether in ‡ation persistence in a manner consistent with the micro-data. To examine this issue, I compare the monetary policy implications of the IC model with those of a model that is observationally equivalent but consistent with the micro-data on prices. Speci…cally, I employ the model suggested by Gali and Gertler (1999) (GG) , which meets these criteria. The GG model assumes that a proportion of …r m s set their prices according to a "rule-of-thumb", while the remainder set their prices according to the Calvo process. In both models, in ‡ation depends on expected in ‡ation and past in ‡ation as well as the output gap. In the GG; the coe¢ cients on past and expected in ‡ation rates depend on the share of the rule-of thumb price-setters, whereas in the IC, the coe¢ cients depend on the degree of indexation to past in ‡ation. I calibrate the two models in such a way that they are identical at the aggregate level.
The conclusions of this paper are brie ‡y summarised as follows: …r s t , the results reported in the paper illustrate the potential for conclusions based on the IC model to be misleading, since policy conclusions that arise from this model are signi…cantly a¤ected by the aspects of the model that are inconsistent with the micro-data. Second, the policy rules that are optimal from the perspective of the IC model can lead to welfare losses. Calculations reported in the paper suggest welfare losses of around 0:02% of consumption.
The lesson applies more generally as well. In particular, I show that the conclusions carry over to the case in which the true model is represented by a model that accounts for the heterogeneity in price spells. As shown by Dixon and Kara (2010b) and Carvalho (2006) , such models take the microdata seriously and can provide an explanation to in ‡ation persistence.
Before describing the models, it is useful to review the literature on this topic. This paper is closely related to the paper by Levin, López-Salido, Nelson and Yun (2008) . Levin et al. (2008) emphasise the importance of micro-evidence on optimal monetary design. They suggest that microeconomic datasets are a promising tool to discriminate between models that are very similar (or are observationally equivalent) at the aggregate level but di¤er in their policy recommendations. To give a more speci…c example from one of the cases that these authors studied, which is relevant to the cases I have considered, they assume that …r m s set their prices according to the Calvo process and then consider two types of real rigidity which lower …r m s ' inclination to increase prices in the face of an increase in nominal aggregate demand. One speci…cation is …r m -s p e c i …c inputs, as in Wo o dford (2003) , and the other is a kinked demand structure, as in Kimball (1995) . They then calibrate the two speci…cations so that they are identical in their implications for loglinear dynamics. Indeed, even though the two models are exactly the same at the aggregate level, the authors show that the speci…cations di¤er in their loss functions and, therefore, in their policy recommendations. The analysis here can be viewed as a special case of the more general analysis by Levin et al. (2008) which does not involve a contrast between the models that are consistent with the micro-evidence and those that are not.
Section 2 describes the models. Section 3 derives a utility-based objective function for the central bank. Section 4 describes the calibration of the parameters. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Model
The model is a standard New Keynesian model. I will consider two alternative price-settings: the Calvo model with indexation and the Gali and Gertler model.
In the model, there is a continuum of identical and in…nitely lived households (h 2 [0; 1]). These households derive utility form consumption and leisure. They buy a continuum of di¤erentiated consumption goods, which they value according to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Corresponding to the continuum of households h there is a unit interval of …r m s , f 2 [0; 1]. Each …r m f is twinned with household h (f = h) 2 . It operates a technology, Y ft = Z t L ft ; that transforms labour (L ft ) into output (Y ft ) subject to productivity shocks (Z t ). These products are then combined to produce the …n a l consumption good Y t : The production function or aggregator is DixitStiglitz. The government conducts monetary policy and levies a proportional tax t on all goods.
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The Macroeconomy
The Euler condition from the representative household's consumption decision can be represented as
whereỹ t = y t y N t is the gap between actual output, y t and the natural level of output, y N t . r t is the nominal interest rate. rr
denotes the real interest rate when prices are ‡e x i b l e . and the tax rate( t ) is at its average level ( ) : r N t , N ft and y N t denote the nominal interest rate, the in ‡ation rate and the output level when prices are ‡e x i b l e and the tax rate ( t ) is at its average level ( ), respectively.
The natural level of output (i.e., the level of output when prices are ‡e x i b l e and the tax rate ( t ) is at its average level ( )) is given by
where z t = log Z t is a productivity shock. The productivity shock follows an AR(1) process. In particular,
where " zt is an idd(0; 2 z ): These equations are common in both models. The models di¤er in their price setting beahviour. In the IC model, price adjustment is based on the assumption that each period a fraction ! of …r m s , chosen randomly, adjust their prices optimally, while the …r m s that do not adjust their prices update their prices to a fraction of last period' s in ‡ation rate. As Wo o dford (2003, p. 213-218) shows, these assumptions give an in ‡ation equation of the form:
is the inverse of the labour elasticity, is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent goods and~ t = log (1 t ) is tax shocks,which follow an AR(1) process:
The GG model assumes that a fraction of …r m s set their prices according to a "rule-of-thumb". The rest of the …r m s set their prices according to the Calvo process. More speci…cally, the price set by the rule-of-thumb …r m s at time t are the price level a Calvo price-setter sets in t 1 plus an adjustment for in ‡ation, which is based on lagged in ‡ation. Steinsson (2003) shows that the in ‡ation equation is in the same form as in (4), expect that the coe¢ cients b ; f and y are di¤erent and depend on . In the GG model, the coe¢ cients are as follows:
The GG model can be thought of a two-sector economy in which in one sector …r m set their prices according to a rule of thumb and in the other …r m s set their prices according to the Calvo model.
Monetary Policy Rule
I assume that the central bank follows a simple Taylor-typ e rule under which the interest rate reacts to the lagged interest rate, in ‡ation and the output gap.
r t = r r t 1 + t + y y t
The -coe¢ cients in front of the targeting variables are chosen to minimise welfare loss.
To provide a measure of the relative performance of this policy rule in a given model, I also report its relative loss, which gives the ratio between the loss under the rule and the …r s t best welfare level obtainable in that model. The welfare level under the …r s t best can be obtained by using Lagrangian methods. More speci…cally, this is the welfare level that can be obtained by maximising the welfare function subject to the equilibrium conditions. I obtain the …r s t order conditions of this problem by di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to each of the endogenous variables and setting these conditions to zero. I then combine the …r s t order conditions together with equilibrium conditions and calculate the implied welfare level 4 .
We l f a r e Functi ons : Wo o d f o r d 's Approximation
In the IC model that leads to (1) and (4), Wo o dford (2003, p. 402) shows that the second order approximation to the welfare of the representative household is given by
where
In the case of the GG model, Steinsson (2003) shows that, by following the procedure in Wo o dford (2003), the second order approximation to the welfare of the representative household is given by
where 1 r = ! 2 (1 ) . The loss function in the GG model penalize ‡u c t u a t i o n s in the output gap, in in ‡ation and in ( t t 1 ).
The Choice of Parameters
I begin with a calibration in the IC model. Following the literature (e.g. Dixon and Kara (2010a) , Walsh (2005) , Wo o dford (2003)), I set = 6; cc = 1; LL = 1:2. A range of estimates for a for the U.S. are reported in Table 1 . The estimates of a indicate that the degree of indexation is around 0:66 0:84. The estimates of ! indicate that the proportion of …r m s that set prices is between 0:07 and 0:17. Given these numbers, I follow Del-Negro, Schorheide, Smets and Wouters (2007) Gali and Gertler (1999) . Given the calibrated values of ! and , I set ' 10, which is the value of used in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) , so that the coe¢ cients on the output gap and the tax shocks in the GG model are the same as those in the IC model. Finally, I assume that the shocks processes are the same in the two models. The productivity shocks follow an AR(1) process. The serial correlation parameter is assumed to be z = 0:95; and the standard deviation of the shock is set to be " zt = 0:007. These are standard assumptions in the real business cycle literature. For the tax shocks, following Walsh (2005) , argued that the degree of indexation in the US is as low as 13%. The Levin et al. (2005) conclusion is surprising because Levin et al. (2005) use a model that is very similar, if not identical, to that in Del-Negro et al. (2007) . Unfortunately, there is no hint to be found in Levin et al. (2005) as to why the degree of indexation is substantially lower in their model. Searching for the reason would lead me beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, here I take the Del-Negro et al. (2007) view, which re ‡ects the common view. Recent work by Smets and Wouters (2007) replace the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator with a more complicated aggregator (i.e. a Kimball aggregator (Kimball (1995) )) and …n d that doing so reduces the degree of indexation. The degree of indexation in this model is 24%. However, such an assumption has signi…cant implications for optimal policy design. I leave this issue for a separate paper and here focus on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
the serial correlation parameter is calibrated as = 0:80 and the standard deviation of the shock is set to be " t = 0:024: Walsh obtains these values by estimating an AR(1) process for detrended log …s c a l variables, using the dataset on tax revenues complied by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) .
Results
In this section, the main results, based on numerical simulations, are presented. First, I will discuss how policy conclusions are a¤ected by whether in ‡ation inertia arises in a manner consistent with the micro-data. I will then evaluate the welfare costs of employing a model that is inconsistent with micro-evidence for monetary analysis. To do so, I assume that the true model is the GG one and that the central bank employs the IC model when formulating its monetary policy. More speci…cally, the central bank simulates the IC model to …n d the optimal reaction coe¢ cients in the policy rule. I then compute the welfare loss as a result of such a policy in the true economy (i.e. using the GG model). Welfare levels (W ) are expressed in terms of the equivalent percentage decline in terms of steady state consumption, which can be obtained by dividing W by U c C. Welfare levels under optimal policy correspond to those discussed in Section 2.2.
Optimal Policy and Micro-evidence on Prices
In this section, I evaluate the performance of the optimised Taylor rule for each model. Table 2 displays the welfare losses under such a rule for each model when coe¢ cients are chosen optimally. As is evident from the table, the optimised rule performs very well in each model: welfare losses in terms of consumption (i.e. the di¤erence between the welfare loss under the optimised Taylor rule and the welfare loss under optimal policy).are nearly zero. Table 2 : The welfare losses in terms of (%) change in steady-state consumption relative to the optimal policy However, as Table 3 also shows, the models di¤er in their recommendations for the optimal policy. Reported are the optimal -coe¢ cients that minimise the welfare loss in each model. A key di¤erence arises when it comes to how aggressive the central bank should be in its response to in ‡a-tion. According to the GG model, the coe¢ cient on in ‡ation in the policy rule should be = 1:82. The IC model suggests a value of that is much less than that suggested by the GG model. The value of suggested by the IC is = 0:48: The …n d i n g that the central bank should not react strongly to in ‡ation in the IC model is in line with the …n d i n g s reported in Wo o dford (2003, p. 482-483) . This is due to the fact that the assumption of indexation alters the loss function of the central bank in an important way. The central bank in this model aims to stabilise ‡u c t u a t i o n s in ( t a t 1 ) ; rather than t ; since the …r m s that do not change price update their prices according to the most recent in ‡ation. To put it di¤erently, stabilising ‡u c t u a t i o n s in in ‡ation does not improve welfare in the IC model, simply because the central bank in this model cares about the ‡u c t u a t i o n s in ( t a t 1 ). On the contrary, given the policy trade-o¤, this policy would be very costly, as it would require larger output gap ‡u c t u a t i o n s . Table 3 con…rms this intuition. Reported in the table are standard deviations ofx t ; t and t a t 1 . Under the optimal Taylor rule, t is more volatile than t a t 1 . However, the volatility in t is irrelevant for welfare loss. For example, if the central bank reacts strongly to in ‡ation, say = 1:82; which is the value suggested by the GG model and holds other factors constant, t becomes less volatile; however, this leads to greater output variability and, therefore, higher welfare loss. The welfare loss in the latter case is 1.3 times higher than that under the optimised Taylor rule. Therefore, when the IC model is employed for monetary policy analysis, the conclusion is that it is costly to stabilise the ‡u c t u a t i o n s in in ‡ation. Consider now the GG model. The GG suggests the need to react to in ‡ation more strongly than is suggested by the IC. The reason for this result is that price dispersion in the GG model is higher than that in the IC model. The loss function in the GG model penalises ‡u c t u a t i o n s not only in ( t t 1 ), as in the IC model, but also in t . Increased degree of price dispersion makes price stability more important in the GG model than in the IC model. It also means that the relative weight of the output gap term in the loss function in the GG model is lower than that in the IC model. As a consequence, output gap ‡u c t u a t i o n s are less costly in the GG model than in the IC model. Indeed, re ‡ecting the stronger reaction to in ‡ation, the volatility of the output gap in the GG model is 40% higher than that in the IC model. However, deterioration in social welfare caused by a larger degree of ‡u c t u a t i o n s in the output gap in the GG model is smaller than that in the IC model.
We l f a r e Costs of Ignoring Micro-data on Prices
I now turn to my main question: how much welfare loss would be incurred if a central bank were to formulate its policy by employing the IC model? Table  4 provides an answer to this question by assuming that the true economy is represented by the GG model.
True Model
Policy generating models GG IC; a = 0:76 GG 0:00 0:02 Table 4 : The welfare losses in terms of (%) change in steady-state consumption relative to the optimised Taylor rule in the true model (i.e. the GG)
As is evident from the table, employing a rule that is optimal from the perspective of the IC model can lead to a poor outcome in the GG. At around 0.02%, the welfare loss in terms of consumption is far from negligible 6 . In light of the above discussion, the reason why the policy suggested by the IC model leads to a poor outcome in the GG is easy to understand. The IC recommends a small value for . The resulting policy is not su¢ cient to stabilise ‡u c t u a t i o n s in in ‡ation in the GG.
Robustness
Thus far, I have focussed on two models: the IC and the GG. The reason for this choice is to illustrate the lesson of the paper in the most transparent way possible (i.e., with strict observational equivalence). However, it is important to note that the lesson applies more generally. To show this, I consider a case in which the true model is represented by a model that can account for the heterogeneity in contract lengths that we have observed in the data. Multi-sector models have shown to be a promising alternative to the existing models in modelling in ‡ation persistence (Carvalho (2006) and Dixon and Kara (2010b) ). To achieve this I employ the Generalized Taylor Economy (GT E) (Dixon and Kara (2010a) , Dixon and Kara (2010b) and Kara (2010)) In the GTE model, as in the other models, there is a continuum of …r m s f 2 [0; 1]. Corresponding to the continuum of …r m s f, there is a unit interval of household-unions (h 2 [0; 1]). Each …r m is then matched with a …r m -s p e c i …c union(f = h). However, unlike the other models, The unit interval is divided into N sectors, indexed by i = 1:::N . The share of each sector is given by i with P N i=1 i = 1: Within each sector i, there is a Taylor process. Thus, there are i equally sized cohorts j = 1:::i of unions and …r m s .
Each cohort sets the price which lasts for T i periods: one cohort moves each period. The share of each cohort j within the sector i is given by ij = 1 i where P T i j=1 ij = 1. The longest contracts in the economy are N periods. We can represent the price-setting behaviour in the GT E in terms of three general equations: one for the optimal price in sector i (x it ), one for the average price in sector i (p it ) and one for the average price in the economy (p t ): These are:
The optimal price (8) in sector i is simply the average (expected) optimal ‡e x price over the contract length (the nominal price is constant over the contract length). The optimal prices will, in general, di¤er across sectors, since they take the average over a di¤erent time horizon and are hit by di¤erent shocks. The average price in sector i (9) is related to the past optimal prices in that sector. The average price in the economy (10) is simply the weighted average of all ongoing sectoral prices. As in the other models, aggregate demand is given by the Euler condition (1) and the central bank conducts monetary policy according to the Taylor rule given in (5).
The loss function is given as
This expression implies that welfare loss depends on the variance of the output gap and on the cross-sectional price dispersion. Tables 4 and 5  repeat the same exercises as Tables 1 and 3 respectively but assume that the true model is represented by the GTE, rather than the GG. I consider a special GT E : Calvo-GT E, in which the share of each duration across …r m s
i 1 : i = 1:::1) is the same as generated by the Calvo model (Dixon and Kara (2006) Calvo-GTE 0:00 0:013 Table 6 : The welfare losses in terms of (%) change in steady-state consumption relative to the optimised Taylor rule in the true model (i.e. Calvo-GTE)
As is evident from Tables 4 and 5 , the results in the pervious subsections, when the true model is represented by the GG, carry over to the setting in which the true model is the Calvo-GTE. As Table 4 shows, the optimised Taylor rule performs really well in the Calvo-GTE. The table further shows that the policy that the Calvo-GTE suggests is very similar to the policy suggested by the GG 7 . Compared to the IC; the Calvo-GTE suggests the need to react to in ‡ation strongly. The magnitude of the welfare loss due to employing a model that does not respect micro-data is in line with what the GG model suggests. Speci…cally, the welfare loss in terms of consumption is 0:013% 7 However, it should be noted that the need to react to in ‡ation in the Calvo-GTE is not as strong as in the GG. The GG suggests a value of = 1:8; whereas the Calvo GT E suggests = 1:4. This di¤erence re ‡ects the presence of the backward-looking-rule-ofthumb price-setters in the GG and is consistent with the common view that in ‡ation is harder to control in back-ward looking models. In fact, as discussed earlier, the loss function for the GG model clearly shows that price dispersion in the model increases as the proportion of backward-looking-rule-of-thumb price-setters increases.
Summary and Conclusions
The Calvo model's failure to account for key macro-evidence has led to a main response in the literature: the introduction of indexation to the Calvo model (IC). However, this model is inconsistent with the micro-data on prices, as all prices change at each period. The purpose of this paper has been to investigate the consequences of employing models that are inconsistent with this aspect of the micro-data for optimal monetary policy design. To achieve this, I have used a model suggested by Gali and Gertler (1999) (GG) . At the aggregate level, the GG model is isomorphic to the IC model and is consistent with the micro-evidence. It assumes that a fraction of …r m s set their prices according to a rule-of-thumb. The rest of the …r m s set their prices according to the Calvo process.
The …n d i n g s reported in this paper suggest that policy conclusions are signi…cantly a¤ected by the aspect of the IC that is inconsistent with the micro-data on prices. More speci…cally, the aspect of the model that is inconsistent a¤ects how aggressive a central bank should be in its response to in ‡ation. The IC model suggests that the central bank should not react to in ‡ation strongly whereas, the GG suggests the opposite. Thus, a failure to recognise the importance of micro-data on optimal policy design signi…cantly a¤ects policy evaluations and can therefore lead to the design of policy rules that may not be appropriate for implementation. Indeed, the policy rule suggested by the IC leads to poor outcomes in the GG model. We evaluate the welfare losses at around 0.02%.
It is important to emphasise that the results are not con…ned to the GG model. I show that this is the case by employing a multi-sector model that accounts for the heterogeneity in contract lengths, which are considered to be providing an alternative explanation for in ‡ation persistence. The results also hold in such a set up as well.
I conclude, therefore, that the models that are inconsistent with the micro data should not be used for monetary policy analysis and that central banks can improve monetary policy by employing models for monetary policy analysis that take micro-data on prices seriously. The more general lesson is that it is a mistake to put all emphasis on the macro-data and to ignore the micro-data, as has been the case in the past.
